In this essay for The Washington Post, adapted from a piece in Liberties journal, Elliot Ackerman traces the long history of private armies, from Rome to the British East India Company to Russia's Wagner Group, and argues that nations reliant on mercenaries are often fighting wars for the wrong reasons.

A Tale of Two Afghan Units

Ackerman opens with a CIA colleague's side-by-side photos of the chaotic final Afghan National Army flight out of Kandahar and the disciplined final flight of the CIA-backed Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, a private force that proved more effective than Afghanistan's own army.

From Roman Legions to the East India Company

Ackerman traces how Rome's and Britain's empires each came to rely on private or non-native soldiers to sustain their expansion, and how that reliance, from the fall of Rome to the Indian Mutiny, ultimately destabilized the very powers it served.

Wagner, Prigozhin, and the Limits of Deniability

Ackerman traces the Wagner Group's rise as a tool of deniability for Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Prigozhin's growing political power after the battle of Bakhmut, and his failed 2023 mutiny, concluding that a nation unwilling to do its own fighting is usually fighting for the wrong reasons.

Read the Original Article

This essay originally appeared in The Washington Post, adapted from the Spring 2024 issue of Liberties.

Read “What It Means When the Mercenaries Appear” at The Washington Post →