In this TIME essay, Elliot Ackerman argues that the killing of Qassem Soleimani did not begin a new war with Iran, but marked another phase in a decades-long conflict fought through proxies, militias, terrorism, and special operations.

Iran’s Strategy of Asymmetric Warfare

Ackerman traces Iran’s security doctrine to the Iran-Iraq War, a devastating conflict that encouraged Tehran to avoid another large conventional war. Under Soleimani, the Quds Force expanded a strategy built around proxy forces and indirect attacks across the Middle East.

A War Already Underway

Drawing on his service in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, Ackerman describes repeated encounters with Iranian-supported militias, Hezbollah, and Quds Force-backed elements of the Taliban. He argues that American and Iranian forces have effectively fought a limited shadow war for decades, even while both societies remained largely insulated from it.

The Risk of Escalation

Soleimani’s death created the possibility of an escalatory spiral, but both nations had strong incentives to avoid a costly conventional conflict. Ackerman emphasizes that the Iran-Iraq War shaped the thinking of Iran’s senior military leaders and may make them more cautious about widening the confrontation.

Strategy, Restraint, and Luck

The essay concludes that de-escalation requires moderation, precision, and pragmatism, but also luck. Ackerman compares the danger to the summer of 1914, when a seemingly limited assassination helped trigger a catastrophic global war.

Read the Original Essay

Read “After Soleimani Killing, War With Iran Will Likely Continue as It Has for Decades” at TIME →